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Figure 1: Mean maximum single rise in skin conductance in response to threatening stimuli. 
Left panel: SH baseline condition in which the hand was always visible. Central panel: 
In the CH condition, a black cloth covered the right hand so that it could be touched, but 
not seen. Right panel: in the DH condition the hand was absent from both vision and touch 
using the disappearing hand trick (see Supplemental Information Experimental Procedures). 
Planned comparisons between the means of interest revealed that responses for CH Near 
(the location of the hand when hidden by a cloth) were significantly higher than for CH Far 
(empty space next to the Covered Hand), DH Near (the last seen location of the Disappeared 
Hand) and DH Far (the real location of the Disappeared Hand). CHn vs CHf: F[1,10] = 32.483, 
p = 0.0002; CHn vs DHn: F[1,10] = 19.7, p = 0.0013; CHn vs. DHf: F[1,10] = 15.494, p = 0028. 
SH = baseline, CHn = Covered Hand Near, CHf = Covered Hand Far, DHn = Disappeared Hand 
Near, DHf = Disappeared Hand Far. ‘Near’ refers to the location of the middle fingertip of the 
right hand in the CH condition and the last seen location in the DH condition. ‘Far’ refers to the 
middle fingertip of the real (unseen) hand in the DH condition and the equivalent area of empty 
space in the CH condition. Asterisks denote significant differences between means (* < 0.05; 
** < 0.01; *** < 0.001).Multisensory 
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Successful multisensory integration 
is the cornerstone of corporeal 
awareness. Experimental 
investigations of body ownership 
usually require the embodiment 
of additional non-bodily objects 
[1,2]. In contrast, here we asked 
whether experimentally-induced 
disintegration of sensory signals 
could bring about loss of ownership 
and awareness for the real limb 
without the embodiment of an 
alternative representation. In three 
experiments, naïve participants 
placed their hands inside a MIRAGE 
multisensory illusions box and 
reached across to touch their right 
hand with their left. In the crucial 
Disappearing Hand condition, we 
created a situation in which the right 
hand unexpectedly disappeared 
from vision and touch with the result 
that healthy participants reported 
the sensation that they had no right 
hand and that their hand was no 
longer part of their body. In two 
further experiments, physiological 
responses to threat towards the 
disappeared hand were absent  
and self-drawn representations 
of the limb terminated at the 
wrist. These results highlight 
the importance of bottom-up 
processes in the normal experience 
of body permanence and may 
provide the key to understanding 
neuropsychological disorders of 
body ownership.
The MIRAGE multisensory illusion 
box allows participants to see live 
video images of their hands in the 
same physical location as their real 
hands, and for each experiment the 
three manipulations were as follows. 
Seen Hand (SH): participants could 
see and feel both hands as the left 
hand reached across and touched 
the right. Covered Hand (CH): the 
right hand was covered by a black 
cloth so that it could not be seen, 
but could be felt when the left 
hand reached across to touch it; 
Disappeared Hand (DH): the right 
hand disappeared from view and, when the left hand moved across to 
touch it, all that could be seen and 
felt was the table where the right 
hand had once been. We achieved 
the DH trick using a sensorimotor 
adaptation procedure, in which 
the hands slowly, and without the 
subjects realizing, moved outwards. 
This resulted in the felt position of 
both hands being less eccentric  
than in reality. Thus, when the 
left hand reached across to the 
perceived location of the right  
hand, it was not there (see 
Supplemental Information for 
detailed experimental procedures 
and supplemental Figure S1).For the DH condition, participants 
stated that their right hand was not 
part of their body; that it no longer 
belonged to them; that they had no 
right hand and that they did not know 
where it was (Experiment 1). For all 
of these questions, DH recorded 
significant loss of ownership or 
awareness compared to CH and  
SH control conditions, with no 
significant differences between the 
latter (DHvSH: Min. t = 3.80,  
p = 0.009; DHvCH: Min. t = 5.07,  
p = 0.001; SHvCH: Max. t = 2.36,  
p = 0.114). Participants also found 
DH surprising, but reported no other 
unusual sensations other than that 
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normal — a physiological response 
often associated with disownership 
[3] (see Supplemental Table S1 for  
full questionnaire data). 
Pretending to stab the CH 
(Experiment 2) elicited skin 
conductance responses (SCRs)  
only slightly lower than those for the 
SH, while stabbing at empty space 
close to the CH elicited no response 
(see Figure 1). However, following 
illusory disappearance, stabbing 
both the last seen location  
of the DH and the location of the  
real (hidden) hand also elicited 
negligible SCRs — almost as though 
the hand no longer existed within 
internal representations of the body. 
Self-drawn representations of the 
limb consisted either of a forearm 
ending at the wrist, or a forearm with 
a dashed or faded outline to indicate 
where the hand would have been 
had it been there (Experiment 3,  
see Figure S2). 
Participants in Experiment 3 were 
also asked to report whether they 
felt their hand had disappeared at 
any point during the experiment and, 
if so, at precisely which moment they 
had that experience. All responded 
that it was the moment at which 
they reached across and failed 
to make contact with their right 
hand. In addition, when explicitly 
asked at the end of the experiment, 
none were able to give an accurate 
indication as to where their hand 
might have been when they felt it 
had disappeared.
The sense that our body is always 
present is a vital component of 
self-awareness, but the permanence 
of the body is a problem for 
neurocognitive models of body 
ownership that are based upon, and 
tested against, the embodiment 
of non-corporeal objects such as 
rubber hands [1,2]. During illusory 
embodiment, it is assumed that  
the representation of the real  
hand either becomes unified  
with, or is extinguished by, the  
fake hand [3]. Investigations of  
body ownership that always 
involve the addition of fake 
limbs, however, are at odds 
with the loss of ownership 
observed in neuropsychological 
patients with asomatognosia and 
somatoparephrenia who can  
become unaware of their limb, or 
unaware that it belongs to them [4], without the simultaneous 
embodiment of an alternative. 
In addition to the fundamental 
role of the insula [5], continuous 
awareness of the body involves a 
distributed neural network, including 
premotor and parietal regions 
[4,6,7] key for the integration of 
multisensory signals in relation to 
perception of the hand, as well as 
for the processing of objects moving 
towards the hand [8,9]. It has been 
argued that limb ownership relies 
upon a hand-based representation 
of multisensory inputs in premotor 
cortex built upon a fusion of 
visual, proprioceptive and tactile 
information that begins in the 
intraparietal sulcus [2]. Our results 
suggest that the lack of hand 
awareness (and associated lack  
of a SCR) in the DH condition 
indicates a failure to resolve 
disintegrated vision (removed), 
proprioception (realigned) and 
touch (absent) in these key neural 
networks, resulting in a lack of 
ownership for the real hand. 
Importantly, all three components, 
especially the failure to touch the 
disappeared hand, seem necessary 
in producing the disappearance 
effect. Although embodiment 
of rubber hands and a lack of 
awareness for body parts dissociate 
[10], we suggest that they may rely 
on common neural mechanisms and 
bottom-up processes. 
Proprioceptive adaptation 
here was central to the loss of 
awareness (defined as a general 
lack of awareness for the limb, 
rather than a complete absence of 
somatic sensation), but the effect 
goes beyond simple uncertainty 
for limb location. Participants 
knew where their limb should have 
been, and plausible locations 
were restricted by the physical 
constraints of the illusions box, 
yet they still had the sensation 
that their limb was missing and did 
not belong to them. Patients with 
hemianaesthesia or deafferentation 
may become unsure of their limb 
location, but do not lose awareness 
of their limb. Asomatognosia and 
somatoparaphrenia, however, require 
a combination of proprioceptive 
impairment, defective multisensory 
integration and compromised right 
hemisphere spatial systems [4]. The 
combination of poor position sense 
and a failure to update limb position by visual search over an extended 
period of time might disintegrate 
multisensory signals in a similar 
manner to that observed here in 
healthy controls.
We disrupted the continuous 
experience of body ownership by 
selectively making the hand present 
or absent without the simultaneous 
embodiment of an alternative limb, 
supporting a bottom-up failure to 
integrate multisensory signals as 
being key to neuropsychological 
deficits such as asomatognosia and 
somatoparaphrenia.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes  
two figures, one table and supplemental 
experimental procedures and can be  
found with this article online at  
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.08.044.
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